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A major policy confrontation is brewing over United States technical 
assistance to agricultural development efforts in developing countries. 
The longer U.S. farming remains in a financial depression due to com 
petitive pressures on its agricultural exports, the more vehement is the 
criticism that U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid to developing coun 
tries, especially to their agricultural sectors, is stabbing American farmers 
inthe back. Directors of international agricultural programs in the na 
tion's land grant universities feel this heat most directly, as their budgets 
are subject to review by state legislatures. Most of the faculty involved 
in these programs also have speaking and extension responsibilities that 
put them in day-to-day contact with farmers. United States Department 
of Agriculture and USAID officials are grilled on this topic during their 
testimony to Congress.
The response to these pressures has been a careful and documented 
appeal to the empirical record based on a growing volume of academic 
analysis of the relationship between agricultural growth in developing 
countries and trends in agricultural imports, especially from the United 
States. There now seems to be a rough consensus in the agricultural 
development profession that a positive connection exists between these 
two dimensions of the development process. The best summary of this 
view is from Earl Kellogg, an agricultural economist who serves as 
associate director of the International Agriculture Program for the 
University of Dlinois, in a state that feels very keenly the competitive 
pressures on exports:
Developing countries continue to be the best potential growth 
markets for U.S. agricultural exports. To realize this poten-
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tial, they must achieve economic growth that results in in 
creased per capita incomes and foreign exchange availabili 
ty. Because of the size and economic importance of the 
agricultural sector in developing countries, it must contribute 
to this economic growth. In addition, developing countries 
must be able to export products in which they have a com 
parative advantage. To accomplish this growth in income and 
exports will require that developing countries obtain capital 
and technical assistance for agriculture and other economic 
sectors. If growth and development are achieved, develop 
ing countries can continue to be important customers for U.S. 
agricultural exports.
For a number of reasons, then, improving agricultural and 
food production in developing countries is important to U.S. 
interests. These efforts benefit people living in poverty, im 
prove the chances for world peace and stability and also con 
tribute to the long-term prosperity of American agriculture. l
Most of us in the economic development profession hope that this 
view that development assistance benefits both recipient and donor is 
true. The historical record is reassuring. A study of the 1961 to 1976 
period by Bachman and Paulino for the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) noted a positive relationship between 
agricultural production and staple food imports.
The data suggest that staple food exporters have little cause 
to worry about the rapid growth of food production in the 
developing countries. Staple food imports in the rapid-growth 
countries increased much faster than exports, and, conse 
quently, net imports continued to grow. Although the in 
creases in food production in the study countries are im 
pressive, it is evident that in most of these countries food 
production growth rates need to be maintained or further 
augmented to meet the increasing demand for staple foods. 
The expansion of both staple food exports and imports 
reflects on one hand the increased production capacity in par 
ticular crops in these countries and, on the other, the rapid 
ly increasing demand generated by population growth and 
rising income levels. Income-induced increases in demand 
appear to arise from the growing demands for a greater varie 
ty of foods as consumption patterns change. Data from a 
number of rapid-growth countries indicate that part of the
American Agriculture 89
increased demand for staple foods arose from the expanding 
use of staple foods for conversion into livestock and poultry 
products. 2
Kellogg cites analysis carried out at USDA that also supports this 
hypothesis. 3 Lee and Shane present Malaysia as an example of a coun 
try that is becoming a consistent and growing importer of U.S. 
agricultural commodities, especially feedstuffs, while rapidly developing 
both domestic and export-oriented agriculture. 4 A masters thesis at the 
University of Illinois conducted statistical analysis of 77 countries and 
found that in "no estimated equation were results obtained that show 
ed a negative coefficient significantly different from zero for the cor 
relation between per capita agricultural production in developing coun 
tries and their per capita imports of agricultural products." 5 Case study 
analysis of Brazil and South Korea as rapidly-growing countries and 
of Sierra Leone as a slowly-growing country further substantiated these 
statistical results. 6
Thomas Morrison of the IMF Research Department has investigated 
the long-term and short-term factors affecting cereal imports in 1979/80. 
On the basis of a regression model for 48 countries which incorporated 
such long-run factors as GNP per capita, population density on arable 
land, average annual cereals production per capita (for the years 
1977-79), and share of population living in urban areas, as well as short- 
run factors such as cereal production in 1979 as a percentage of the 
average, food aid (cereals) per capita, and gross international reserves 
available at the end of January 1979, relative to the average for the 
1977-78 period, Morrison concluded as follows:
Of the long-term determinants, level of economic develop 
ment is the most significant in explaining cereal imports. The 
coefficient ... is positive and significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level. This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
that level of economic development, through its relation to 
consumption demand . . . positively influences per capita 
cereal imports. The urbanization variable . . . without the 
GNP variable, has the expected positive coefficient, but the 
coefficient is not significant.
Of the variables indicating domestic production capacity, 
only population density is significant. The coefficient is
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positive and significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level. . . . This variable, indicating population pressure on 
arable land, is the most reliable variable representing total 
domestic food production capacity.
Cereal production per capita [average] has the expected 
negative coefficient, but is not significant. One reason why 
the coefficient is not significant is probably . . . that in many 
countries non-cereal crops represent significant shares of total 
food production.
. . . The regression equations explained between 41 and 
82 percent of the variation in per capita cereal imports across 
countries. Since government policies can have a significant 
influence on the level of cereal imports regardless of coun 
try characteristics and circumstances, one cannot expect such 
regression equations to have greater explanatory power. The 
fact that the equations have as much explanatory power as 
they do probably reflects the strong influence the country 
characteristics and circumstances have on government policies 
toward cereal imports.
. . . The empirical results yield certain implications for 
the future of cereal imports by developing countries. It ap 
pears that the rapid growth of cereal imports by developing 
countries during the 1970s, particularly by the middle-income 
countries, will continue to the extent that these countries ex 
perience economic growth and pass into higher stages of 
economic development. Although population growth in the 
developing countries has declined from its peak of about 2.4 
percent in the mid-1960s to about 2.2 percent currently, in 
creasing population pressure on arable land will continue to 
be a significant factor affecting cereal imports in the 
foreseeable future. While food aid as a share of the cereal 
imports of developing countries has declined considerably 
over the 1970s, it will continue perhaps in a more limited 
way to provide cereals to those who could otherwise not af 
ford them. Thus, the same factors that caused the rapid growth 
of cereal imports by the developing countries during the 1970s 
will continue to exert their influence in the 1980s. 7
This line of argument is reasonable and comforting, but it is now 
demonstrably wrong for the 1980s. Why? The world debt crisis, the 
overvalued U.S. dollar, and U.S. farm policy are usually cited as reasons
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why exports of U.S. agricultural products to the developing countries 
have not grown since 1980. Kellogg, for example, drawing on the work 
at ERS by Longmire and Mory on exchange rate problems and by Shane 
and Stallings on the debt crisis, offers the following summary and 
observations:
Although agricultural exports to developing countries have 
increased in the past several years, total U.S. agricultural 
exports have recently decreased from $43.8 billion in 1981 
to $38.0 billion in 1984. There are three major reasons why 
this has happened.
(1) The exchange rate of foreign currencies for U.S. dollars 
has increased. For example, it now takes 32 percent more 
German marks to buy one U.S. dollar's worth of U.S. goods 
than in 1981. A recent USD A study [Longmire and Mory] 
concluded that the stronger dollar cost the United States about 
$6 billion in lost farm exports over the two-year period 
1981-83.
(2) Some U.S. domestic agricultural policies tend to result 
in U.S. agricultural commodities being priced above world 
prices. This is obviously not good policy if one wants to en 
courage agricultural exports in a competitive world economy.
(3) Total world agricultural trade has decreased since 1980 
because of reduced economic growth in many countries and 
increased indebtedness of many developing countries. Shane 
and Stallings have estimated that the debt problem alone has 
lead to a loss in potential export sales to developing coun 
tries of up to 20 percent.
None of these major reasons for declining U.S. agricultural 
exports has to do with increasing agricultural production in 
developing countries which is one of the objectives of U.S. 
universities and AID collaboration. From 1981 to 1984, 
developing country per capita agricultural production has 
essentially remained constant. Therefore, in the aggregate, 
increases in agricultural production within developing coun 
tries has not caused the decline in U.S. agricultural exports 
since 1981. 8
This paper argues that all of these factors the overvalued dollar, U.S. 
agricultural policy, and the mounting debt in developing countries- 
are connected and in turn are related to changing agricultural produc-
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tion in developing countries. Although a focus on any specific factor 
results in a positive relationship between U.S. assistance for agricultural 
development and subsequent value of U.S. farm exports, the picture 
is not so positive when all the factors are considered together. In other 
worlds, a global general equilibrium perspective has different conclu 
sions from those of a partial equilibrium one and has important implica 
tions for the role and impact of U.S. foreign assistance. The ultimate 
conclusions in this paper remain positive, but they contain potentially 
unhappy messages for American agriculture and the need for it to ad 
just to new competitive pressures in world markets.
Explaining Import Demand for Grain
Why do countries import grain? To ask the question in such a bald 
way raises several possibilities other than trade patterns determined by 
short-run costs as reflected in the comparative advantage of trading part 
ners. Recent emphasis on the food price dilemma faced by many develop 
ing countries suggests that grain imports might equally be treated as 
a policy instrument of governments attempting to reach an implicit or 
explicit set of objectives for their food sectors. These objectives can 
range from maintaining a price level (frequently "low") for a prefer 
red foodgrain, assuring price stability, providing "control" over 
foodgrain markets through a government food agency, provisioning a 
livestock-feeding industry that produces meat for urban consumers, or 
even gaining the benefits of free trade. 9
If the volume of grain imports is determined simultaneously with other 
important government policy actions, models designed to predict im 
port levels must come to grips with the basic dynamics of each coun 
try's political economy. In those countries where foodgrain prices are 
an important ingredient in those dynamics, as they are in most coun 
tries of the world, a complex relationship exists among microeconomic 
demand patterns, macroeconomic policies, including basic foodgrain 
prices, and conditions in the world market for food and feedgrains. It 
is as wrong to think that grain imports are determined by relative costs 
and comparative advantage as it is that they are determined solely by
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"political decisions." Each factor influences the other, primarily through 
macroeconomic and budgetary forces. Hence, it is necessary to model 
international grain trading activities in a macro food policy framework. 
Figure 1 shows the first of four different levels of detail in specify 
ing such a model. Few would quarrel with the basic relationship specified 
in Model 1, which says simply that a country's import level is func 
tionally related, through some "black box" of causal mechanisms, to 
its rate of economic growth. What is in the black box is, of course, 
crucial. The figure shows that the primary exogenous factor influenc 
ing the contents of the black box is a country's development strategy, 
especially whether an import-substitution or export-promotion strategy 
is being followed. Much evidence points to a significant influence of 
this strategic choice on the rate of economic growth itself, not just on 
its import intensity. This reverse connection between development 
strategy and economic growth will be incorporated in Model 4 where 
feedback mechanisms are considered. Obviously, other factors such as 
a country's size, its natural resource endowment, and so on also in 
fluence the relationship shown in Model 1.
Figure 1 










Although Model 1 says nothing at all about demand for agricultural 
imports from the United States, its trade balance is strongly influenced 
by the connections in Model 1. In fact, one of the arguments here is 
that, from the point of view of promoting U.S. exports, far more is 
at stake in the overall growth process reflected in Model 1 than in 
agricultural imports per se.
Agricultural imports are the focus of Models 2 and 3. Figure 2 presents 
a rough summary of the structural relationships posited implicitly or 
explicitly in the work cited by Kellogg and summarized in a recent report 
from the Curry Foundation, authored by Paarlberg. 10 The chain of causa 
tion is still fairly simple. Agricultural development, including rising 
staple food production per capita, positively influences the overall 
economic growth process through another black box mechanism. This 
growth translates into import demand through the same factors as in 
Model 1. Overall import demand leads to growing demand for 
agricultural imports, again through a set of complex causal relation 
ships contained in a black box. In Model 2 the black box connecting 
agricultural development with overall economic growth is mediated by 
a country's food policy. 11 The mechanisms that connect overall level 
of imports with agricultural imports includes a system of supply and 
demand relationships for individual commodities as well as the influences 
of income distribution, urbanization, other demographic factors, and 
changing tastes. As stressed above, these mechanisms also include the 
set of food policy objectives, instruments, and interventions.
The expected sign of the statistical relationship between factors con 
nected by black boxes is also shown in figure 2. Normally, each of the 
three relationships should be positive. Agricultural development leads 
to economic growth; economic growth leads to larger import demand; 
and larger overall import demand also leads to larger agricultural im 
ports. The last relationship is the least certain in terms of economic 
logic and rests primarily oiLempirical evidence. Since the relationship 
between rapid income growth and food consumption provides a key 
piece of that evidence, a review of this nexus is a major part of this 
paper. Whatever the historical record, however, it is easy to postulate 
mechanisms that would lead to reduced agricultural imports even in the 
face of economic growth and rising nonagricultural imports.
American Agriculture 95
Model 2 provides a rough vehicle for understanding the positive rela 
tionship that exists in the historical record between a country's 
agricultural development and its resulting agricultural imports. Each 
of the black boxes, however, contains important economic and political 
relationships which are subject to change compared with the historical 
record. In addition, Model 2 is incomplete in terms of explaining the 
"stabbed in the back" phenomenon because the role of technical 
assistance is not yet connected to agricultural development in develop 
ing countries, nor are agricultural imports into a particular country 
translated into the value of U.S. agricultural exports.
Figure 2
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Model 3 attempts to specify these additional relationships. Great con 
troversy exists over the efficacy of technical assistance in helping low- 
income countries develop their agricultural sectors. Some would argue 
that the record is mostly negative; inappropriate technologies and com 
modities are stressed at the expense of village-level knowledge and foods 
of the poor. 12 At the other end of the spectrum is a "science solves 
all food problems" approach which sees a strong positive link between 
foreign assistance and agricultural development. 13 The black box con 
necting these two components of Model 3 reflects these controversies 
by linking technical assistance and agricultural development through 
the choice of an aid strategy. Perhaps the critical strategic choice is 
whether the aid focuses on project or policy assistance, a topic which 
is now receiving much attention in the donor community, with results 
that are beginning to show in world markets.
Model 3 shows two additional components relative to the simple struc 
ture of Model 2. A connection between a country's agricultural imports 
and the volume of U.S. agricultural exports is mediated by factors deter 
mining the competitiveness of U.S. commodities in international markets, 
especially exchange rates and domestic pricing policies, as well as by 
market development efforts by the United States, including the role of 
the PL-480 program. But the United States is concerned with not only 
the volume of agricultural exports but their value as well. To connect 
volume with value, it is necessary to determine the price received for 
the exported commodity. This connection is shown in Model 3 by the 
black box that contains the mechanisms of price formation in interna 
tional commodity markets. This particular black box contains many of 
the global general equilibrium mechanisms that provide cause for con 
cern that the historical record of the 1960s and 1970s will not play out 
so nicely for American farmers in the 1980s and 1990s.
Just as in Model 2, all of the expected statistical relationships con 
tained in the black boxes in Model 3 are positive in sign. Considerable 
debate exists, however, over the two relationships at the bottom. There 
is no doubt that the total volume of U.S. grain exports, for example, 
is positively related to the volume of world trade in grain. But figure 
4 shows that the structure of that relationship depends critically on the
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Figure 3
Relationship Between Technical Assistance and the Value 
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Relationship Between Percentage Change in World Grain Trade 
and Percentage Change in United States Grain Exports
% Change U S. Grain Trade
% Change World
Expected Relationship. U-S. Supplier of Last Resort
Statistical Relationship:
% change in U.S. grain trade=-0.0311 +1.861 x % change in world grain trade 
(1960-1984) (1.4) (8.2) R2 =0.743 D-W=2.16
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role of the United States in world grain markets. If, as many analysts 
have argued, the United States has become the de facto "supplier of 
last resort," the slope of the line that relates percentage changes in the 
volume of world grain trade to percentage changes in U.S. grain ex 
ports will be significantly greater than one. If the U.S. were a large 
but fully competitive country, the slope should be approximately one. 
If the United States were a small country in world grain trade, the slope 
should not be significantly different from zero. For the 25 years be 
tween 1960 and 1984 the coefficient was 1.86 and the r-statistic 8.2.
An additional issue concerns the strength of the relationship between 
the volume of U.S. agricultural exports and the value of those exports. 
If there were a fixed and known elasticity of demand for those exports, 
the sign could be determined unambiguously. But that elasticity is an 
outcome rather than a cause of the relationship. Again, three relation 
ships are plausible, depending on the role of the United States in world 
grain markets and the size and competitiveness of those markets. As 
figure 5 illustrates, if the United States acts as a supplier of last resort, 
there should be a positive relationship between changes in the price it 
receives for grain exports and changes in the volume of those exports, 
which thus guarantees a positive overall relationship between export 
volume and export value.
If the United States is merely a regular competitor in world grain 
markets, there should be no significant relationship between its export 
volume and price received. If the United States acts as a large com 
petitor in pursuit of market share in world grain markets, however, a 
significant negative relationship should exist between its export volume 
and price. This is the critical elasticity of demand for U.S. exports that 
is needed to determine whether export volume and value are positively 
related under this trade strategy, but it is precisely the elasticity that 
is unobservable from historic data if previous policy has not pursued 
this strategy. The statistical record for the same 25 years shows no signifi 
cant relationship between percentage changes in either nominal or 
deflated world grain prices and percentage changes in U.S. grain ex 
ports, with or without a one-year lag, although the sign is always negative 
in the estimated functions.
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Figure 5
Relationship Between Percentage Change in United States 
Grain Exports and Export Price of Grain
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The question can now be put directly: what is known from Model 
3 about the relationship between technical assistance and agricultural 
development in developing countries at the one end and the volume and 
value of U.S. agricultural exports at the other? The historical record 
suggests that each black box is likely to encompass a set of mechanisms 
that generate a net positive relationship between the input factor and 
the resulting output. If all the black boxes have positive signs, the overall 
relationship between agricultural development and U.S. agricultural ex 
ports should also be positive. This is exactly the result that Kellogg and 
his colleagues have found. So we have some confidence that Model 3 
captures the short-run and panial equilibrium mechanisms connecting 
these two factors.
Two potentially important elements are missing in Model 3. First, 
the short-run links treated in Model 3 may be superimposed on more 
powerful, but lagged, connections that operate in the opposite direc 
tion. Some of these lagged relationships are economic but some work 
primarily through political choices made in the face of pressures 
emanating from the outcomes in Model 3. Second, price formation in 
world commodity markets cannot be treated in a partial equilibrium 
framework. The potential commodity substitutions and impact of finan 
cial variables such as debt and exchange rates have a powerful influence 
on these prices, which in turn enter the economic and political feed 
back mechanisms just noted. When these concerns are added to the linear 
format of Model 3, a much more complex set of relationships emerges, 
as is shown in Model 4 in figure 6.
The unidirectional causation of Model 3 gives way in Model 4 to 
several circular feedback mechanisms. Two have already been noted: 
the impact of inward- or outward-looking development strategies on 
the rate of economic growth and import demand; and the impact of food 
policy on agricultural development and its mediating role between that 
development and overall economic growth. 14
The broader feedback mechanisms incorporate connections from both 
markets and political economy dynamics. On the left side of figure 6, 
signals from world commodity markets influence both agricultural 
development and economic growth, although with various lags. To the 
extent that market prices are communicated directly to farmers, the
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Figure 6
Feedback Effects in the Relationship Between Technical Assistance 
and the Value of United States Agricultural Exports
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crucial issue is the supply responsiveness of a nation's farmers to price 
incentives. This responsiveness is obviously a function of time and of 
public sector responsiveness as well. At the farm level, farmers might 
shift the area devoted to various commodities in the short run, or change 
fertilizer applications. In the longer run they can invest in water con 
trol, better production technology, and greater specialization if the market 
will take away their output and provide ample supplies of needed 
household consumption items in return.
The influence of world commodity markets on economic growth is 
through different mechanisms. By determining the amount of foreign 
exchange earned for a given volume of commodity exports, these markets 
directly influence how binding the foreign exchange constraint is. At 
the same time, the signals provide incentives to local entrepreneurs to 
supply export markets as opposed to domestic markets. Depressed world 
commodity markets tend to lead to depressed domestic markets through 
local price competition. Consequently, in those countries that permit 
relatively free transmission of world market prices into their domestic 
economies, a strong link exists between those markets and performance 
in agricultural development and overall economic growth. If one con 
sequence of previous rapid agricultural development (and other factors 
influencing commodity prices) is to push down those prices on world 
commodity markets, then at least one market mechanism is established 
that will dampen further agricultural development and economic growth 
and thereby lead to a reduction in demand from developing countries 
for commodities from these markets.
The right side of figure 6 shows that there are important political 
economy mechanisms that establish this connection as well. Growing 
agricultural imports, especially at high prices, induce countries to devote 
more attention to their agricultural sectors to reduce their political ex 
posure to unstable world markets. This wariness must be one of the 
major outcomes of the world food crisis in the mid-1970s. Some of 
the high prices of that period were felt directly by farmers as countries 
simply lost control of their domestic price stabilization programs. More 
important for the long run, however, was the signal to governments 
that it would be both expensive and politicially dangerous to rely on
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world markets for basic grains, a lesson that was reinforced by the soy 
bean embargo and Soviet grain embargo attempted by the United States. 
The result was implementation of price policies with better incentives 
for farmers, more investment in rural infrastructure such as roads and 
irrigation, and far more serious attention to the development of an in 
digenous agricultural research and extension capacity (all of which are 
now the ingredients of "good" policy advice).
All of these changes take time to manifest themselves in terms of in 
creased output, but when it arrives on domestic markets, a double-edged 
effect is felt on import demand from world commodity markets. Higher 
real prices in domestic markets induce both greater production and reduc 
ed demand. The result is sharply reduced import demand or even a switch 
to exports of important food and feed grains, as in the case of Indonesia, 
China, and India. If related factors such as falling petroleum prices and 
high debt levels are contributing to slowed economic growth in low- 
and middle-income countries, the added market supplies meet very slug 
gish growth in demand and thus exacerbate the downward price pressures 
on agricultural commodity markets. In a rather perverse twist, the fall 
ing petroleum prices and attempts to earn foreign exchange to meet debt 
repayment schedules reinforce these dynamics because agricultural ex 
ports have a shorter lead time and learning curve than industrial ex 
ports and face less protection in developed countries (until now). A rather 
vicious downward spiral is set in motion, which was initiated by an 
apparently healthy response to the world food crisis of the 1970s and 
the recycling of petrodollars.
How does the United States respond in such a situation? With surplus 
agricultural commodities on hand and a stark picture of hunger televis 
ed on the evening news, one temptation is to renew the market develop 
ment thrust of the PL-480 program, to feed the hungry with America's 
bounty. But the potential dangers to agricultural development efforts 
of dumping our surpluses in substantial quantities into a country's 
domestic food markets are now well recognized. 15 Most countries would 
accept such food aid only if it directly offset commercial imports other 
wise planned. Since this is contrary to both the letter and intent of the 
law, sharply expanded PL-480 shipments do not seem possible.
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The commercial competitiveness of U.S. commodities is determin 
ed primarily by the value of the dollar in foreign currency markets and 
by domestic farm policy. Both of these factors are affected by prices 
in world markets and, in turn, have feedback effects on the outcome 
of each of the relationships shown in Model 4. Just as the devaluation 
of the dollar in the early 1970s for reasons unconnected to agriculture 
stimulated U.S. agricultural exports and farm earnings, so did its pro 
gressive revaluation during the early 1980s dampen those exports and 
earnings. The U.S. Congress does not legislate much positive agricultural 
trade policy; it does, however, set domestic agricultural price policy 
to protect farm incomes. The effect until the 1985 Farm Bill was to 
set the prices of many U.S. export commodities above those of the com 
petition and thus lose market share, which resulted in higher prices for 
our competitors than would prevail with open competition.
The political economy dynamics of this approach are now becoming 
clear. Large budget deficits forced Congress to design a more com 
petitive farm price policy even in the face of existing low incomes in 
the American farm sector (but large deficit costs remained because of 
continued target price support). Additional commodities will move on 
to world markets and drive prices down even further, at least temporarily. 
The lower prices make imports even more attractive to those countries 
open to international grain trade, but they simultaneously threaten fur 
ther those countries that maintain active price policies on behalf of their 
farmers. Providing better price incentives to farmers in developing coun 
tries has become a main theme of policy advice that accompanies 
technical and financial assistance. A major contradiction is emerging 
between market signals and important elements in the agricultural 
development process. As American farmers watch more and more coun 
tries protect themselves from the pressures of low-priced U.S. 
agricultural commodities, the political pressures will increase on the 
land grant universities, USAID, and USD A to stop their assistance to 
agricultural development programs. Slowing the pace of agricultural 
development, however, will in fact slow the pace of economic growth 
in the developing countries. They will then serve as less dynamic markets 
for U.S. exports of all goods and services, including, in the short run, 
exports of agricultural commodities.
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The Historical Record and Income-Led Growth
Despite the perilous and complicated feedback mechanisms that seem 
to be operating in Model 4, the long-run growth of agricultural imports 
in developing countries has been a stimulus to U.S. agricultural exports. 
Figure 7 shows the shares of U.S. agricultural exports to various destina 
tions for fiscal year 1976-77 and projected for 1984-85. The share of 
developing countries, including China, rose from 35.5 percent in 1976-77 
to 40.4 percent in 1984-85. The nominal value of total exports rose 
roughly 60 percent during that time while the consumer price index 
rose about 80 percent. After inflation, the real purchases of U.S. 
agricultural commodities by developing countries remained almost con 
stant, helping to offset a decline in the real value of purchases from 
Western and Eastern Europe, Canada, and Oceania. Real purchases from 
Japan and the U.S.S.R. increased significantly.
Two quite separate forces seem to be at work in generating the in 
creased demand for agricultural imports in developing countries. The 
first, and the smaller in absolute terms, is the failure of domestic 
agricultural production to keep pace with population growth and food 
demand in urban areas. This is primarily an African phenomenon. Table 
1 shows that African imports of grain have increased from a total of 
5.9 million metric tons in 1970 to an average of 24.9 million metric 
tons for the 1980-83 period, or by 13.3 percent per year. During the 
same period, production of corn, rice, and wheat increased 2.2 per 
cent per year, substantially behind the 2.9 percent per year increase 
in population. Real per capita incomes have also been falling during 
this time, although certain regions and countries have shown signifi 
cant increases. 16
The great bulk of increased demand for U.S. agricultural exports over 
the past two decades has come from income-induced patterns of food 
consumption. This is most readily apparent from table 2, which is 
reproduced from Monke's paper on international grain trade for the 
World Bank. 17 Total growth in import demand for cereals between 
1948-52 and 1979-81 was over 170 million metric tons, of which Monke 
attributes about 30 million metric tons to declines in per capita grain 
production and about 33.5 million metric tons to population growth.
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Figure 7
U.S. Agricultural Export Percentage Shares to Selected Destinations 


























SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign Agricultural 
Trade of the United States (Washington, D.C.), March-April 1985 and various other issues.
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The remainder, 107 million metric tons, is a residual that must be ac 
counted for by rising per capita incomes, changing tastes, urbaniza 
tion, and so on.
Table 1
African Grain Imports by Region in Millions of Metric Tons 
1970 and Yearly Average 1980-83
Percent change 
Grain/Region 1970 1980-83 1970 to 1980-83
Corn
N. Africa .10 




N. Africa .05 
S. Africa .08 
Sub-Saharan Africa .65
Total .78
Wheat and Wheat Flour, 
Wheat Equivalent
N. Africa 2.79 



























SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Trade Yearbook (Rome,
Italy), various issues.
Totals may not add up due to rounding.
The patterns of food demand generated by rising incomes have been 
studied for well over a century, and Engels Law—the declining share 
of food expenditures in total household expenditures as per capita in 
comes rise—has been well-documented from both time series and cross
Table 2





























































SOURCE: Eric A. Monke, "International Grain Trade, 1950-80," AGREP Division Working Paper (Washington, D.C.. The World Bank, January 1983). 
a. Calculations for CPEs are made for the 1960-80 penod, due to lack of data on intra-CPE trade for the 1948/52 period. Trade between market economics 
and CPEs was extremely small during this period, but increased substantially during the 1950s. If per capita imports by CPEs during the 1948/52 period 
were assumed equal to those of 1960, the effects of population growth on trade would increase to 2.77 and 4.15 million metric tons for the developed 
and developing CPEs, respectively. These calculations yield overestimates, and do not alter the conclusions presented in the text.
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section data. The changing composition of the diet with rising incomes 
has also been scrutinized as agricultural ministries search for com 
modities with bright prospects for consumer demand in order to max 
imize the payoff to their research and extension efforts. 18
Relatively less attention has been given to the indirect demand for 
commodities generated by the food consumption patterns of the more 
affluent. In 1974, Lester Brown presented a striking table showing the 
indirect demand for grain at income levels at which grain-fed livestock 
products became affordable. Grain demand per capita in the United States 
and Canada, for example, totaled five times the amount in India or 
China. 19 In times of grain shortages and pessimism over future sup 
plies, this large indirect demand for grain was interpreted as a threat 
to the world's capacity to feed its poorer population. In times of surplus, 
indirect demand for grain is seen as an important source of export 
markets for U.S. farmers, and so it is worth examining the relation 
ship between income and grain demand more closely.
The relationship depends heavily on the distinction between quantity 
and quality of the diet. Both of these attributes change as incomes in 
crease, but the quality dimension is much more income-elastic after 
minimum caloric intake levels are reached. Tables 3 and 4 report the 
results of a systematic attempt to quantify these different trends; Ap 
pendix 1 shows the sources of data for the 34 countries in the sample 
and the composition of the 117 cases drawn from those countries. The 
income variable is measured in purchasing power parity as determined 
by Kravis and his colleagues. Prices are measured with similar ad 
justments to market or official exchange rates; consequently much of 
the real income effect of different price levels between poor and rich 
countries has already been captured in the income variable. Any 
significance of the variable measuring food prices relative to nonfood 
prices is thus capturing a pure substitution effect rather than an overall 
market effect, which includes both the real income effect of price changes 
as well as the substitution effect.
The first seven equations have log of caloric intake as the dependent 
variable. For the total sample, per capita income has a very high ex 
planatory power, and the income elasticity is equal to 0.20 when in 
come is entered alone in Equation Cl. It remains as high as 0.15 in
Table 3
Elasticity Coefficients from Calorie Intake Regression Analysis 
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Elasticity Coeffkients for Various Aspects of Diet Quality 
















































































Equation C5 when variables are included for calorie requirements (which 
reflect average body size, activity levels, and climate) and for price 
response in low-income countries.
When the price variable is added in Equation C2, the income elasticity 
drops only slightly; the price elasticity is -0.1 and significant only at 
the 10 percent level. Prices and incomes are negatively correlated after 
the Kravis adjustments, and so the income variable captures some of 
the price effect. With prices alone in the equation, the estimated elasticity 
rises in absolute value from -0.10 to -0.66.
The elasticities for developing countries are expected to be larger than 
those for developed countries. The income elasticity should be higher 
because caloric intake has physical limits—"the narrow confines of the 
human stomach." The price elasticity estimated here, which is close 
to a pure substitution effect, should be higher because of the "Timmer 
effect," which states that "the pure substitution elasticity tends to decline 
in absolute size as incomes rise at about half the rate of decline in in 
come elasticities. . . ." 20
These issues are tested in Equations C6 and C7, which report separate 
equations for subsamples of the developed and less-developed nations. 
The income and price elasticities for developed countries are much lower 
than those for the developing countries and were not statistically signifi 
cant. The Timmer effect was roughly confirmed. The decline in income 
elasticity from 0.15 for low-income countries to 0.06 for the high-income 
countries represents a decline of 60 percent. The decline in the substitu 
tion elasticity should therefore be about 30 percent. The actual decline 
is 50 percent, but a 30 percent decline is well within the likely margin 
or error.
The estimates of the "calorie requirement elasticity" in Equations 
C4 and C5 have little operational meaning other than the obvious: a 
1 percent increase in "requirements" does not automatically lead to 
a 1 percent increase in caloric intake. Per capita incomes and food prices 
play a critical role in determining whether requirements can actually 
be satisfied.
Three measures of dietary quality are analyzed in table 4. Equation 
Ql shows the starchy staple ratio regressed against income. The elasticity
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of -0.39 is highly significant and has substantial predictive power, as 
the simple equation has an R2 of 0.74. Even the introduction of low- 
income slope and intercept shifters, along with a price term, raises the 
R2 only to 0.80. Per capita incomes are clearly the dominant factor ex 
plaining this measure of dietary quality. To the extent a difference is 
likely to exist in income elasticities for the starchy staple ratio, the 
elasticity for developed countries should be larger in absolute terms. 
This would happen partly because the population of poor countries would 
exhibit a certain inertia in behavior—many wealthy individuals in Asia 
do not feel they have "eaten" without rice at a meal. In addition, signifi 
cant scope exists for upgrading the diets of low-income populations 
within the context of starchy staples. Wheat can thus substitute for 
sorghum, or maize for cassava, and then rice for maize. Only when 
diets begin to diversify dramatically in quantitative terms to meat, sugar, 
fish, milk, and other high-quality and expensive calories does the 
starchy staple ratio decline rapidly.
This hypothesis is borne out in Equations Q5 and Q6. Separate equa 
tions for developed and developing countries show that the income 
elasticity of the starchy staple ratio is -0.64 and -0.23, respectively. 
Both coefficients are highly significant. A different formulation in Equa 
tion Q3 using dummy variables for low per capita incomes found vir 
tually identical results.
The three equations for protein illustrate a characteristic of this par 
ticular sample and a behavioral relationship of some significance. Equa 
tion Q7 shows a protein-income elasticity of 0.25 when the total sam 
ple is combined. When the sample is split, the elasticity for developed 
countries is 0.04 and the low-income elasticity is 0.15. Neither elasticity 
from the split sample is as high as from the combined sample. Normal 
ly, the elasticity for the total sample should be a weighted average of 
the two subsamples. That is not true here for two reasons. First, the 
developed country sample represents a different population from that 
of the developing country sample due to different calorie requirements 
as well as to a host of other "modern'' traits that do not come immediate 
ly with higher incomes. Second, patterns of behavior take considerable 
time to adjust to changed income levels. The elasticities for each sam-
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pie separately can be thought of as representing short-run adjustments 
to income change, whereas the elasticity for the combined sample 
represents a long-run adjustment.
Equations Q10 to Q12 examine the relationship between animal pro 
tein and incomes. The income elasticity for animal protein is 0.77 for 
all countries but only 0.65 and 0.47 for developing and developed coun 
tries, respectively, which again shows the potential importance of short- 
run versus long-run dietary adaptations to income change. The implica 
tions of these large income elasticities for animal protein can be seen 
in table 5, which is patterned after Brown and reports both direct con 
sumption of grain per capita and indirect consumption through livestock 
feeding, for a variety of countries from the United States to India. 21 
Despite direct intake of grain in the United States of almost exactly one- 
half the Indian level, total grain consumed is 4.5 times as large as In 
dia's total grain consumption per capita—646 kilograms per years as 
opposed to 143 kilograms. The level was even higher before U.S. 
livestock feeders sharply reduced their feeding of grain in the wake of 
high grain prices in the mid-1970s.
A significant impact will be felt on world grain markets if' 'follower'' 
countries adopt American-style diets and the indirect demand for grain 
implicit in them. If all the countries from Japan and below in table 5 
were to reach the average level of grain consumed in the United Kingdom 
and Germany (340 kilograms per capita per year, a figure only slightly 
more than half the United States level), more than 300 million metric 
tons of additional grain would be needed, a figure equal to one-sixth 
of global production of grain. Excluding both India and China from 
the calculation leaves an added grain demand of more than 60 million 
metric tons, more than one-quarter of world grain trade in recent years.
If income growth precedes rapidly in these countries, the derived de 
mand for grain through increased meat consumption will be a major 
factor determining the balance between supply and demand in world 
grain markets. Failure of incomes to grow as rapidly as in the past, 
however, will depress demand and could lead to significant grain 
surpluses in years of good harvests. If, in addition, there has been a 
structural change in the interaction of developing countries with world 
grain markets, as was argued previously, the outlook for American
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grain farmers is bleak indeed. This bleak outlook stems not from "sur 
prises" in the black boxes, that is, in fundamentally different mechanisms 
connecting each level of a developing country's food system with the 
next. Rather, the changed outlook comes through the relatively greater 
importance of feedback mechanisms as income growth slows down. The 
more that income growth is stimulated through assistance to agricultural 
development, the more powerful will the feedback effects become. In 
addition, a set of largely external factors are impinging to make the pros 
pects for U.S. grain exports in the 1980s less favorable than they were 
in the 1970s or even the 1960s. 22
Table 5














































































SOURCE: FAO, Food Balance Sheets, 1975-1977.
NOTE: Grain consumed indirectly is not corrected for imports and exports of meat and poultry.
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The first of these factors is the unusual pattern of economic growth 
in the 1970s. The especially successful examples of agriculturally-led 
economic growth spilling over into rising agricultural imports have been 
in East Asia—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. All three countries have 
very low ratios of land to population, and all have relied heavily on 
industrial exports to the United States and Western Europe to fuel their 
growth, which has been extraordinarily rapid by either historic or con 
temporary comparative standards. While further gains in U.S. 
agricultural exports to these markets are possible, the largest increases 
have already been achieved. In addition, the United States faces sharp 
competition for these markets from other Asian countries whose ex 
port sectors have been stimulated by market-oriented food policies and 
the new structure of world commodity markets. Thailand, China, and 
Indonesia have the capacity to meet much of the rising demand for 
feedgrains in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. If Burma and Indo-China 
ever adopt market-oriented food policies that provide better farm in 
centives and public infrastructure for improved agricultural productivity, 
Asia could be awash in surplus grain.
The opportunities to reproduce the East Asian pattern of the 1960s 
and 1970s are practically nil. The lucrative markets of the OECD coun 
tries are increasingly closed to exports from newly industrializing coun 
tries. To earn the foreign exchange needed to import capital goods and 
to pay existing debt, most countries will be forced to export agricultural 
rather than industrial goods. The result will be added competition in 
world commodity markets, either directly as with rice, corn, soybeans, 
or cotton, or indirectly as with palm oil, rubber, or jute. As more coun 
tries seek sources of growth in agriculture, these competitive pressures 
will increase, and commodity prices will remain depressed.
Second, the technological basis for agricultural development in the 
1980s and 1990s is likely to be significantly different from that in the 
1970s. The Green Revolution of the 1970s was primarily based on wheat 
and rice systems with good water control. Much of the increase in U.S. 
agricultural exports in the 1970s was in coarse grains and soybeans, 
crops for which little new technology was applicable to the tropics. 
Because of significant progress in breeding and cultivation techniques,
118 Timmer
substantially higher yields for most of the coarse grains are now possi 
ble in the humid tropics, and similar progress may be in sight for 
legumes. 23
A third factor depressing the outlook for U.S. agricultural exports 
is the erosion of its cost advantage in producing higher value-added prod 
ucts such as broilers, soymeal and oil, and textiles. When the basic com 
modities that provide the raw materials for these products cost more 
for domestic producers than they do for international competitors such 
as Thailand, Brazil, or China, it is impossible to retain markets previous 
ly established or to gain new ones. Between 1980-81 and 1983-84, the 
export of oilseed meals and poultry dropped by 34.4 percent, whereas 
overall U.S. agricultural exports fell by "only" 10.8 percent.
In total, three general sets of factors seem destined to make the> 1980s 
a very different decade from the 1970s for American farmers: reduced 
global rates of growth in incomes; general equilibrium feedback effects 
on world commodity markets; and several specific features with respect 
to countries, technologies, and cost structures. There is only a limited 
response that U.S. policy can make in this new environment. Reduc 
ing the value of the dollar by bringing government expenditures in closer 
balance with revenues may raise the dollar price of commodities in world 
markets and help make American farmers more competitive, but it will 
make exports from developing countries less competitive and slow their 
rate of growth. The net effect on commodity markets is not clearly 
positive, and the dollar's decline since February 1985 has not helped 
very much by early 1987.
A more competitive pricing structure for U.S. farm products will help 
regain market share and also lower input costs for value-added prod 
ucts. But it will also drive down prices in world markets, at least in 
the short run, leaving basic commodity producers worse off.
United States technical assistance can focus on raising agricultural 
productivity in developing countries and rely on historical relationships 
to speed their economic growth and demand for agricultural imports. 
But if the lagged feedback mechanisms from both the market and political 
economy continue to push countries toward smaller food imports and 
increased emphasis on agricultural exports, the general equilibrium con-
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sequences of this strategy mean it will backfire as a vehicle for assisting 
American farmers.
One can only conclude that no solution exists to the problem of low 
incomes of American farmers if the policy intends for present farmers 
to produce more output at higher prices. A competition-oriented policy 
that drives down world prices may eventually force some high-cost com 
petitors, especially smaller farms in Europe, out of the market, but it 
will lead to a significant shake-out of American producers as well. From 
the comfort of a university it is easy to say that this is inevitable, even 
good for farmers, because they will earn higher incomes in the industrial 
or service sector. Jobs in those sectors, however, depend on the general 
health of the United States economy, and this in turn depends on overall 
American competitiveness and capacity to sell abroad. And this returns 
the story to the very simple relationship in figure 1, in which economic 
growth in developing countries leads to increased import demand in 
general. Finding ways to help these countries speed their general develop 
ment process is the critical task for the United States if it wants a healthy 
economy at home. The evidence and logic point to rapid agricultural 
development as the key to this process, even if it increases competitive 
pressures on American agriculture through a complicated web of feed 
back and general equilibrium processes. Policies that help farmers cope 
with these pressures by easing the pain of structural change are the 
only appropriate response.
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17 countries; 61 cases
TOTAL SAMPLE: 34 countries; 117 cases
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Philippines (3) 
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